This paper examines the degree to which the importance of wages elsewhere in wage determination stems from comparisons made by workers, as opposed to re°ecting unions' fall-back options in the bargaining process. The di±culty of distinguishing these hypotheses is shown in the context of a bargaining model. It is argued that the use of the wage of a`pay leader' solves the fundamental problem of identifying`comparison wages' that might not also constitute part of workers' expected income if negotiations were to break down. The empirical work uses a unique panel of data covering 321 unionised bargaining units in the UK chemicals industry between 1978 and 1989. Results support anecdotal reports of pay leadership and suggest that wages elsewhere matter because comparisons are important to workers. In this sense, the results support the notion that`fairness considerations' drive wage interactions.
Introduction
There is a substantial amount of evidence, both anecdotal and empirical, that wages elsewhere a®ect wage determination. There is less agreement about why wages elsewhere matter. Industrial relations, sociology and psychology literatures emphasise the importance of comparisons, often linked this to`fairness considerations' and`equity'.
From the standpoint of industrial relations, Ross (1948) has argued that \comparisons play a large and often dominant role as a standard of equity in the determination of wages under collective bargaining" (p. 50).
1 The psychologist Adams (1963) is generally credited with the original formulation of`equity theory' | the notion that agents compare their relative`inputs' and relative rewards. The sociological counterpart to this theory is Runciman's (1966) relative deprivation theory; this too claims that people's conceptions of fairness are based on comparisons with salient others.
Economists, on the other hand, have generally emphasised other explanations for the apparent importance of the wages of others. In particular, the popular`pure' bargaining model predicts that wages elsewhere will a®ect wage determination, as they form part of the`fall-back' or`outside' option of workers.
2 . In the pure bargaining model the in°uence of others' wages has nothing to do with fairness-related comparisons.
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This paper presents an empirical assessment of the extent to which wage interactions re°ect comparisons made by workers, as opposed to re°ecting the`fall-back' situation of workers if bargaining breaks down. Comparisons with others are commonly thought to be driven by`fairness considerations', when individuals make interpersonal comparisons (of utility) and have`empathetic preferences' (Binmore, 1994) . Consequently, the results of this investigation can be interpreted as re°ecting the importance of`fairness' in wage setting.
Fairness' is often connected with`equity' (equal pay for equal work), a desire for which is often thought to motivate wage comparisons: \fairness, or equity, means the equality of reward/input ratios. Individuals assess themselves against`comparison' others" (Carruth and Oswald, 1989, p. 102) . Comparisons could also be motivated by envy. Arguably, envy also involves interpersonal comparisons of utility, and hence, in a broad sense,`fairness considerations'. For the purposes of this paper, whether comparisons are driven by equity or envy is a secondary consideration; the focus is whether such comparisons matter in wage determination.
The importance of comparisons is di±cult to test empirically. It is hard to provide a rationale for the importance of one comparison rather than another. Because of the problem of identifying reference groups, comparison wages are often taken to be identical to workers' fall-back options, which makes it impossible to distinguish empirically fairness-in°uenced from pure bargaining models.
In this paper the task of identifying reference groups is facilitated by the use of disaggregated data from the UK chemicals industry during 1978{1989. 4 There is plenty of industrial relations and anecdotal evidence that a dominant pay leader operated during the period of study, namely Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). Pay leaders act as a focus for wage comparisons; they provide a likely`reference' wage, but are unlikely to form a potential`fall-back' for workers. Whereas in the event of a breakdown in pay negotiations workers might be able to¯nd work at wages related to average wages in the industry or locality, it is unlikely that they could expect to obtain jobs at ICI, or jobs paying an equivalently high wage. ICI's wage might form part of the fall-back, but only part: other wages should also matter in determining the level of the fall-back wage.
4 The dataset is described more fully in the Appendix.
This distinction allows us to compare statistically the impact of comparison and fall-back wages on pay determination. Econometric results lend support to the hypothesis that a good part of the in°uence of wages elsewhere stems from inter-group comparisons.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brie°y assesses evidence for the in°uence of wage comparisons, emphasising the particular role of pay leadership in the chemicals industry. Section 3 sets out a bargaining model of wage determination that highlights the problem of distinguishing fairness-in°uenced from pure bargaining models of wage setting, and provides a possible solution focussing on the behaviour of pay leaders. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Comparisons and pay leadership
There is a large quantity of survey and case-study evidence for the importance of various types of wage-wage comparison. 5 The discussion here is con¯ned to facts relating to¯rms in the UK chemicals industry during the 1980s, which are the focus of the econometric work. The evidence will be shown to be consistent with the existence of pay leadership in the industry.
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Survey evidence concerning the importance of comparisons in the wage setting process in UK establishments, coinciding with the period of the present study, is provided by the CBI Pay Databank (see Gregory et al., 1985; 1986; Ingram, 1991) .
Where comparisons are important, it appears that settlers tend to have one main wage referent: over 1980{84, one third reported that only one comparison was very important, whereas only 15 per cent considered two or more referents very important (just over half of settlements gave no wage comparison a`very important' rating in any one pay round) (Gregory et al., 1985) .
5 See the literature cited in footnote 1. 6 Theoretically, pay leadership is an n-bargaining group generalisation of the usual Stackelberg game, where one bargaining group acts as leader (i.e. taking the reaction functions of the other bargaining groups as given); the other bargaining groups act as followers, optimising against the leader's strategy.
There are considerable di®erences across industries in the reported importance of comparisons. Comparability pressures \have regularly been strong among high settlers and weak among low settlers" (Gregory et al., 1985, p. 352 Products, Associated Octel, and BOC Gases Division (all gases manufacturers and distributors), and Ilford and Kodak (photographic materials). Of these, ICI is cited most commonly, and is often thought to act as leader for wages and conditions within the chemicals industry (see Gill et al., 1978 , for example).
There are many examples of ICI's leadership on pay and conditions. Turner (1956) reports that \ICI once left the chemical employers' federation on the question of its power to pay rates above its associates, and its present membership appears conditional on the retention of separate bargaining arrangements" (p. 105). In 1969 the company introduced the path-breaking`Weekly Sta® Agreement' (WSA). In 1992, a new agreement on working practices, described by the GMB as \revolutionary", was negotiated between ICI and unions on the company's national negotiating committee, to replace the WSA. In return for a 14 per cent wage rise, a decrease in standard weekly hours to 36 (from January 1993), 30 days' holiday per year, improved training and the \maintenance of the job security guarantee", the unions agreed to changing working practices. The impact of ICI's settlement is demonstrated by the GMB union's`targets' for 1992 negotiations in other¯rms. The GMB's¯rst priority was to aim for less than 38 hours a week and more than 25 days' leave a year: \One of our targets for 1992 must be to ensure that our members in other companies are not left behind in this [ICI's] move towards leisure time" (1992 Survey).
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Although this evidence is consistent with ICI acting as pay leader in the UK chemicals industry, this is di±cult to prove on the basis of the type of evidence examined in this section. We can get further towards proof by examining econometrically the relative in°uence of ICI's wage and other wage measures, as in Section 4. To reiterate the ultimate aim: by demonstrating the existence of pay leadership we also hope to show that pay elsewhere a®ects bargained wages because comparisons (relativities) matter, which may be driven by equity considerations.
3. The problem of distinguishing equity-in°uenced from pure bargaining models
The problem of distinguishing between pure bargaining models and those where fairnessin°uenced comparisons matter can be illustrated by a simple`right-to-manage' model which highlights the di®erent roles played by outside wages in the two types of model.
If comparisons matter, the union cares about the excess wage it obtains for its members over and above some`reference' (or`fair') wage. The union's utility will be weakly increasing in the bargained wage W and weakly decreasing in the reference wage W R .
This can be represented by the general utility function:
7 ICI has not always been in the forefront of improvements in working conditions, but is clearly expected to be a leader in this respect. In the early 1980s the company was left behind in annual holidays, a fact which was noted in the`1983' GMB Survey: \ICI has remained behind the NJIC agreement on 20 days. Clearly the negotiating success on hours at ICI [agreement on 37.5 hours from January 1983] needs to be complemented by similar action on holidays if the 35,000 manual workers under the Weekly Sta® Agreement are to maintain their place in the forefront of the wages and conditions movement" (pp. 23-4).
where -W > 0 and -W R < 0.
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This utility function can be combined with the usual maximum pro¯t function for the¯rm, where pro¯t ¦ is a function of the wage W and employment N (both of which are endogenous) and is subject to the exogenous in°uences of the own product price P and technology A (a productivity shift parameter). Then the (symmetric) Nash bargaining problem is:
where -and ¦ are, respectively, the union's and¯rm's fall-back options. Employment is set by the¯rm: N =N (W ; P; A). This can be substituted into (3.2). Then, representing -(W ) by W and dropping exogenous determinants of pro¯t for clarity, the wage is given by:
Just as in pure bargaining models, the wage appears to be a mark-up on the reference wage, the size of the mark-up depending positively on the¯rm's pro¯t (or, equally well, revenue) per employee and the union's fall-back, and negatively on the¯rm's fall-back.
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The main problem in distinguishing models where fairness matters from pure bargaining models arises because the union fall-back -(which represents workers' expected reward during a temporary stoppage) and the reference wage W R are both usually assumed to re°ect wages elsewhere in the economy. 10 In this case, outside 8 The semi-colon indicates a conditional: variables to its right are treated as¯xed, or exogenous. 9 Denoting terms in (3.3) 1,2,3 and 4, the signs of the partial derivatives are:
10 -may also depend on the chance of employment | potentially a®ected by the unemployment rate, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, the long-term unemployment rate, the replacement ratio, etc.
wages would appear in the solution | and hence as a determinant of wages | whether or not equity-related comparisons are important. Where equity matters, however, in addition to their appearance as a determinant of the union's fall-back option, outside wages enter the bargaining problem because the union cares about wage di®erentials and the outside wage determines the wage di®erential for any bargained wage.
But the`reference' wage W R does not have to be (will generally not be) identical to workers' fall-back option W , the`outside' wage which workers expect to obtain through working elsewhere. It would be possible to distinguish the two rationales if there were some wage variable which might represent comparisons, but would not normally be thought to capture workers' fall-back options. It was argued in Section 2 that the wage of a dominant, leading group could play such a role.
The fall-back wage can be de¯ned as workers' expected wage if the current bargain breaks down:
probability of obtaining job at bargaining unit i £ wage at i
The set of wages in principle included in the fall-back for any given worker includes the wages at all¯rms where the worker puts a non-negligible probability on obtaining a job if the current negotiations break down. The probability of obtaining a job elsewhere is subjective and unobservable. If this probability is equal across bargaining units, the fall-back wage could be modelled as a simple average of wages elsewhere.
But the probability of getting a job might be expected to vary across¯rms | in particular, in relation to employment. In this case, the fall-back can be modelled as an employment-weighted average of wages elsewhere. The empirical work of this paper makes use of unweighted and employment-weighted average wages as measures of fall-back, respectively W AV and W AV N . We also examine the in°uence of the industry regional average wage W R . Workers fall-back wages might well be an average of wages in their region if they face signi¯cant relocation costs, for example. The
If workers' fall-back options are identical to the`reference' wage W R then, given the utility function (3.1), the¯rst term in the Nash maximand (3.2) would be
potential importance of comparisons within the locality is clear from survey and other evidence (for example, see the analysis of the CBI Pay Databank survey in Brown and Walsh, 1991, especially Table 4 , p. 52).
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Our empirical tests also investigate the in°uence of the median and modal wages.
These might be more readily observable or computable proxies for a probabilityweighted fall-back; alternatively, they might capture workers' idea of a`fair' or ref-
erence wage. Because they have the potential to act in both roles, the median and modal wages cannot be used to assess whether the importance of wages elsewhere stems from comparisons or fall-backs. The ICI wage is the only measure that might act as a fair wage but not as a fall-back.
Econometric results
This weighted by company employment. ICI's wage is the`reference' or`fair' wage. The median and modal wages might be proxies for the fall-back | they may be more readily observable than the complex probability-weighted averages; or either might capture the workers' idea of a fair wage. Each alternative real wage measure is included separately (lagged and in natural logarithms) as the alternative wage measure (see Table 1 ).
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The¯rm's bargaining strength is hypothesised to be increasing in its holdings of inventories (per employee) at the beginning of the period, since they might reduce the costs to the¯rm of a strike (see Clark, 1991) .
13 Union bargaining strength is increasing in the current ratio of vacancies to unemployment in the locality of the bargaining unit and inversely related to the current local unemployment rate. A greater proportion of long-term unemployed in the total might increase the bargaining power of`insiders' (see, for example, Nickell, 1987) . The capital-labour ratio is included to capture productivity trends or the¯rm-speci¯city of workers (which might increase their bargaining power). The equations also allow for unobserved e®ects that are speci¯c to each bargaining unit and constant over time, and all potentially endogenous rm-level variables (indicated by d over the mnemonic) are instrumented with their own previous two lags. Estimation is conducted using LIMDEP.
The estimated equation is:
where: ® 0i capture unobserved bargaining unit-speci¯c characteristics that remain constant over the sample period; (¼ ¡ n) jt¡1 is lagged pro¯ts per employee at company 12 ICI settle in July | at the end of the August-to-July wage round. Most settlements occur between January and May, so it is ICI's wage for the previous year that will in°uence wage setting. Results are robust to the use of current-dated alternative wage measures, which might represent expectations.
13 Alternatively, large inventory might indicate worse economic conditions than the¯rm had been expecting, which might induce the workforce to accept a lower settlement. j; (k ¡ n) jt is the current capital{labour ratio; (stk ¡ n) jt¡1 is the level of total stocks at the end of the previous period; U R Rt is the rate of unemployment in the bargaining unit's region R; (V =U ) Rt is the regional vacancy{unemployment ratio; U R52 t is the aggregate proportion of long-term in total unemployment. Lower-case letters denote variables in natural logarithms. The signs of the predicted e®ects are shown under the relevant coe±cients.
All measures of the alternative wage appear to positively a®ect bargained wages.
As predicted by the bargaining model, a higher stock of inventories seems to enable the¯rm to hold down the wage. A higher capital-labour ratio results in a higher wage.
When signi¯cant, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment has the expected positive coe±cient But other labour market variables do not have the e®ects predicted by bargaining models. The coe±cient on the unemployment rate is signi¯cant and positive. This is not unprecedented | see Beckerman and Jenkinson (1990) and Nickell and Kong (1992) , for example | and can be explained by compensating di®erentials arguments: workers may demand a premium for working in an area of high unemployment if unemployment has undesirable externalities (high crime, for example), or if the probability of being made redundant is proportional to the level of unemployment in the local area. A higher long-term unemployment rate is associated with reduced real basic pay, which might suggest it captures worse economic conditions rather than greater insider power.
Non-nested tests can be used to compare the relative in°uence of the alternative wage measures (see Table 2 ). The tests used are J -tests (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981) : for dependent variable y and competing sets of regressors X and Z, y is regressed on X and¯tted values obtained, then y is regressed on these¯tted values and Z. If Z is the correct set of regressors, the coe±cient on the¯tted values from the X-regression should be close to zero (a t-test is used to determine whether this is so). This procedure is then reversed; the set of regressors Z is preferred only if the results of the reverse procedure are consistent. , 1978-1989 Notes: (i) Dependent variable is real basic wage of lowest-grade worker (excluding canteen/cleaners) in bargaining group including production and general workers. Upper case letters refer to real-valued variables, lower case to natural logarithms.
(ii) Alternative Wage: w R Regional industry average; w AV Industry average; w AV N Company employment-weighted industry average; w M ED Median; w M OD Mode; w ICI ICI wage. . . . Table 2 : J-tests comparing alternative wage measures Notes: Probability that t-value is greater than coe±cient given in square brackets under the relevant t-statistic. Dominance of particular outside wage measure requires t-statistic in relevant column to be higher than its mirror image (when re°ected in main diagonal). * indicates dominance in such comparisons.
Although the ICI wage clearly forms part of the fall-back measures based on full sample averages, there is no identi¯cation problem: the in°uence of the ICI wage as`fair' wage can be readily distinguished from its part in the fall-back, as the fallback measures include wages at other bargaining units that are not at all highly correlated with ICI's wage. Indeed, the correlation between ICI's wage and those of other bargaining units in the full sample is only 0.3.
14 On balance, the results suggest that the ICI wage is more in°uential than other measures of the alternative wage. Although comparisons of ICI's wage with the regional, median and modal measures are inconclusive at conventional signi¯cance levels, the relative size of the t-statistics reported in Table 2 | which can be used as an indicator of`dominance' | suggests that ICI's wage is the more in°uential. The preferred measures of fall-back wages have relatively little in°uence on wage setting. Perhaps surprisingly, the employment-weighted average wage is the least in°uential (it is dominated by all other measures). The regional average is dominated by all`alternative wage' measures except this employment-weighted average. The unweighted average measure is dominated by the ICI wage and the median. In contrast, the ICI wage dominates in every case.
The same conclusion results from nested tests in which the ICI wage is included along with each alternative wage measure in turn (see Table 3 ). Arguably, the inclusion of the \fair" wage in addition to the \fall-back" wage is recommended by equation (3.3). Although collinearity might a®ect the estimates, the dominance of ICI's wage appears robust (in practice, coe±cients other than the alternative wage are largely unchanged). The \fall-back" wage can be rejected, its coe±cient being indistinguishable from zero, in three cases | the regional, aggregate and median measures | and 14 ICI has equal weight with the hundreds of other bargaining units in the unweighted average wage, and has a weight of 7% (equal to its share of company employment) in the weighted measure of the fall-back. ICI bargained on a company-wide basis during the period of study. Although other bargaining units are owned by large companies, they operated plant-based bargaining; for these groups, there is a substantial di®erence between employment at bargaining unit and company levels. As a consequence, ICI is relatively large in terms of bargaining unit employment, accounting for an average of 22% of bargaining unit employment. ) for test of restriction that coe±cient equal to zero, and associated probability (* indicates dominance).
Statistics
with only slightly less con¯dence in the case of the modal wage.
These striking¯ndings are strongly supportive of the idea that wage-wage comparisons are important. The wages of a¯rm that is widely recognised as a leader in terms of pay and conditions have a larger e®ect on wage determination in other bargaining units in the industry than reasonable measures of the fall-back wage.
Conclusions
This paper has examined whether comparisons made by the workforce lie behind the importance of wages elsewhere in wage determination, or whether the apparent interactions re°ect unions' fall-back options in the bargaining process. The di±culty of distinguishing these hypotheses was shown in the context of a`right-to-manage' bargaining model. Many of the wages elsewhere that appear to in°uence wage bargaining could perform a dual role: they might form`reference wages', but, equally, they might constitute part of workers' expected income if negotiations were to break down. Their use as measures of comparisons (or`fairness') is indistinguishable from their role as fall-back options.
It was argued that possible measures of`comparison wages' can be identi¯ed, in the form of wages at a dominant¯rm in an industry. Dominant¯rms might act as`pay leaders', but because they could not provide employment for all workers in another rm, their wages would be a more imperfect representation of fall-back wages than, for example, average wages in the industry or location. Vacancies at Jobcentres and career o±ces { analysis by standard regions.
All variables de°ated by retail price index excluding mortgage interest payments (from CSO Economic Trends, Table 26 : Prices) except the regional average wage which is de°ated by regional price indices excluding housing costs (from The Reward Group Cost of Living Report: Regional Comparisons, Table 7C : Regional indices { consumer prices).
